21 February 1973

SUBJECT: Fact Sheet on CIRIS Data Call for Calendar Year 1973

1. PROBLEM: The ASD(I) will resist a CIRIS data call for CY-1973 unless it is specifically requested by the DCI.

2. BACKGROUND:

a. Resources data based on a common vocabulary for the intelligence community are centralized only in the DCI CIRIS system. Rather than centralized data, the ASD(I) prefers to develop separate data systems for each of the Defense intelligence programs. Under his staff's concept, the DCI would depend on the ASD(I) to provide resources data on call.

b. CIRIS was developed, in response to a 1966 OMB initiative, to relate resources to the intelligence tasks for which they are provided. CIRIS data, collected since 1968, show these relationships from a cross-program, cross-functional perspective.

c. The two Special Activities Programs, accounting for about 40% of CDIP dollars, are reviewed by the EXCOM and are not considered in detail during ASD(I) CDIP review. ASD(I) review of the balance of CDIP resources has been primarily dollar-oriented, and has not made a coherent examination of the relationship between resources and intelligence tasks. The ASD(I), therefore, does not use the CIRIS data and does not believe there is a use for them in Defense intelligence management.

d. A recent survey of the IC Staff confirmed a need for task-oriented resources data. NSA's internal, computerized management system includes CIRIS data for the CCP and APS. DIA, just starting work on a GDIP management system, appears to have identified the same variables that are used in CIRIS, but with possible differences in their partitions.

e. ASD(I) resistance delayed the 1972 CIRIS data call for over four months. As a result, task-oriented resources data were not available to the IC Staff for the first NIPM and Community Planning Guidance.

f. CIRIS data submissions for Air Force Special Activities were delayed until after the November 1972 EXCOM review. It was possible, therefore, to combine the 1972 and 1973 data calls for that program. Those data are now on hand.

3. DISCUSSION:

a. The ASD(I) does not appear willing to afford the DCI and his staff the task-oriented, cross-program and cross-functional view of Defense intelligence that CIRIS data can provide. No other system provides this perspective.

b. CIRIS data for over two-thirds of CDIP resources (Air Force Special Activities, the CCP and APS) are either now on hand or will soon be available from NSA computer programs.

c. Whatever objections there may be to CIRIS, it is the only source for the data that the IC Staff needs to meet its overall requirements for relating resources to intelligence tasks. If Defense does not promptly implement the 1973 CIRIS data call, the IC Staff will not have, for the second straight year, the task-oriented CDIP and community resources data when they are needed. Nor will the DCI have the kind of data from which viable alternatives to Defense intelligence program proposals can be developed.

d. We support ASD(I) development of management systems for CDIP programs. This is a complex, long term project. CIRIS is an important model for this developmental effort. It is the only system that is based on a framework that is common to Defense, State and CIA intelligence.

4. CONCLUSION: There should be no further interruption in the reporting of task-oriented Defense intelligence resources data. CIRIS should not be abandoned with nothing now available to replace it. If and when ASD(I) successfully develops other systems that satisfy DCI-level intelligence management information needs, IC Staff resources reporting requirements can be modified.

5. RECOMMENDATION: DCI approval of the draft letter at Tab A.

Prepared by: IC/Data Support Group (NCF/MH)